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Abstract This paper assesses the relationship between institutions, output, and productivity
when official output is corrected for the size of the shadow economy. Our results confirm
the usual positive impact of institutional quality on official output and total factor productiv-
ity, and its negative impact on the size of the underground economy. However, once output
is corrected for the shadow economy, the relationship between institutions and output be-
comes weaker. The impact of institutions on total (“corrected”) factor productivity becomes
insignificant. Differences in corrected output must then be attributed to differences in factor
endowments. These results survive several tests for robustness.
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1 Introduction
The consensus that institutions are a key determinant of economic development has led
international organizations to devote a great deal of attention and resources to improving
the institutional frameworks of developing countries. Various conventions have accordingly
been set up, such as the 1998 UN resolution or the OECD’s (1999) “Convention on com-
bating bribery.” The political consensus is indeed backed by a parallel consensus based on
results from a decade of empirical research. Spurred by the seminal papers of Mauro (1995)
or Knack and Keefer (1995), this line of research has repeatedly concluded that ailing in-
stitutions are associated with lower GDP per capita growth. Later studies, such as Hall and
Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001), extended this finding to the level of per capita
income. Furthermore, Hall and Jones (1999) and Olson et al. (2000) observed that the bulk
of the relationship between institutions and income runs through the impact of institutions
on total factor productivity.
Although these consonant observations have drawn a consistent picture of the relation-
ship between institutions and development, they all share a common drawback that may turn
out to be crucial in the context of developing economies in particular: they use official output
figures. The problem here is that most official output figures neglect a sizeable share of eco-
nomic activity which takes place in the informal sector and, therefore, remains unrecorded
in official statistics, namely the shadow economy. According to Schneider (2005a, 2005b,
2007), the shadow economy amounted to 39 % of economic activity in developing countries,
on average, and up to 40 % in transition countries in 2002–2003. These figures consequently
call for caution in interpreting empirical results emphasizing the negative impact of defective
institutions on income. They emphasize that official income decreases when, for instance,
corruption increases or the rule of law deteriorates, but do not guarantee that the same holds
true for total income, defined as the sum of official and unofficial income.
Previous research moreover suggests that the shadow economy flourishes in countries
laden with defective institutions, thus acting as a substitute for the official economy. In John-
son et al.’s (1997) model, for instance, corruption increases the size of the shadow economy
because it can be seen as a form of taxation and regulation, which drives entrepreneurs un-
derground. Hindriks et al. (1999), on the other hand, argue that the shadow economy is a
complement to corruption. In their view, taxpayers can collude with corrupt inspectors so
that the latter underreport the tax liability of the taxpayer in exchange for a bribe. According
to the empirical results in Dreher and Schneider (2010), better institutions reduce the size of
the shadow economy. Similarly, Johnson et al. (1998a) observed that a one point increase in
Transparency International’s corruption index would imply a 5.1 point decrease in the share
of the shadow economy.1
To summarize, good institutions seem to increase official output, while at the same time
reducing unofficial output. One may accordingly contend that the observed correlation be-
tween institutions and income may be less substantial than it first seems and result only
from a drop in recorded output. In other words, production might not disappear, but only
1Once other dimensions of institutional quality are controlled for, the relationship between the size of the
shadow economy and corruption is not robust, and differs between developed and less developed countries
(Dreher and Schneider 2010). Overall, however, institutional quality seems clearly to reduce the size of the
shadow economy in developed and less developed countries alike.
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go underground, which is a special case of Hirschman’s (1970) exit option, as Schneider
and Enste (2000) argue. Even if this substitution from official to shadow production was
imperfect, the negative impact of bad institutions on overall income would be dampened.
This intuition is consistent with Johnson et al. (1998b), who report that the relationship be-
tween corruption and growth becomes insignificant once the shadow economy is added as
an explanatory variable. At any rate, a systematic investigation of the relationship between
institutions and total income, as opposed to official income, is warranted. This is precisely
the aim of this paper.
To foreshadow our main results, we confirm the positive impact of institutional quality on
official output and total factor productivity, and its negative impact on the size of the under-
ground economy, reported in the previous literature. However, once output is corrected for
the shadow economy, the relationship between institutions and output becomes weaker. The
impact of institutions on total (“corrected”) factor productivity even becomes insignificant.
Our line of reasoning is based on the following steps. In the next section, we recall the
theoretical impact of institutional quality on the shadow economy, output, and productivity.
In Sect. 3, we correct official output figures for the shadow economy and compare the dis-
tribution of per capita income using both raw and corrected figures. We then probe deeper
into the impact of the shadow economy on output by performing a development accounting
analysis, following Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005). Here, differences in income
are broken down into differences in factor endowments and total factor productivity. Sec-
tion 4 uses this decomposition to determine the channels through which institutions affect
per capita income. We thus check whether institutions are still significantly correlated with
per capita output and total factor productivity once correcting for the size of the shadow
economy. The final section concludes.
2 The impact of institutions on the shadow economy, output, and productivity:
theoretical considerations
In this section, we briefly provide our theory on the impact of institutions on the size of the
shadow economy, output, and productivity.
2.1 The impact of institutions on the shadow economy
As argued in the Introduction, the size of the shadow economy should be sensitive to the
quality of institutions. The shadow economy is part of the general institutional context, as
Tanaka (2010) points out. Consequently, various dimensions of the institutional framework
affect how taxes and regulations are implemented, thereby affecting the costs and benefits
of being formal or informal (e.g., Teobaldelli 2011). Their role may even be more important
than the actual burden of taxes and regulations.
The first dimension of the institutional framework that affects the incentive to be formal
or informal is corruption. Johnson et al. (1997) remark that corruption works as an additional
form of taxation and regulation, therefore increasing the costs of being formal. Hindriks et al.
(1999) argue further that corruption and the shadow economy are complementary in nature,
because corruption makes it possible for taxpayers to bribe tax inspectors so that the latter
underreport the former’s tax liability.
Second, Johnson et al. (1998a) emphasize that arbitrary implementation of legal rules is
an additional burden on official activity, providing the incentive to move to, or remain in, the
shadow economy. By the same token, Chong and Gradstein (2007) argue that weak formal
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property rights reduce the benefit of operating in the formal sector, thereby increasing the
size of the shadow economy.
Finally, Dabla-Norris et al. (2008) argue that better institutions should result in a higher
probability of detection of firms operating in the shadow economy. Better institutions should
therefore increase the incentive to stay in the formal sector, and decrease the size of the
shadow economy.
2.2 The impact of institutions on output, factor accumulation, and TFP
The notion that institutions are a fundamental determinant of economic outcomes can at the
very least be traced back to the work summarized by North (1994) and Acemoglu et al.
(2005). Political and social institutions shape economic institutions, which in turn, shape
economic incentives. More precisely, institutions that provide more secure property rights
will provide individuals with stronger incentives to accumulate factors of production, inno-
vate, and participate in economic activity in general.
Accordingly, the quality of institutions may affect the accumulation of both physical
and human capital. Reducing investment when the institutional environment provides lower
expected returns is a rational behavior that has been repeatedly observed using many dimen-
sions of the institutional framework, surveyed by Brunetti and Weder (1998). The accumu-
lation of human capital may be affected in a similar way. Moreover, one may allude to the
fact that education is often provided by the state and necessitates public infrastructure. If the
institutional framework leads to the diversion of resources from education to less productive
uses, then its effect will be reinforced. Unsurprisingly, institutional quality has been found
to be correlated with the stock of human capital, for instance, by Hall and Jones (1999).
Beside factor accumulation, institutions may also affect productivity for three main rea-
sons: predation, diversion of productive resources, and the quality of accumulated factors of
production. First, predation acts as a tax on productive activities and reduces the returns ac-
cruing to those responsible for them. This provides an incentive to use productive resources
less intensively, thereby reducing total productivity. Second, the diversion of resources away
from productive activities is a corollary to the risk of predation. A weak rule of law, resulting
in widespread theft, for example, prompts agents to divert productive resources elsewhere in
order to protect their property. Similarly, an ill-designed regulatory framework may encour-
age rent-seeking, i.e., taking advantage of loopholes in the protection of property rights. Fi-
nally, weak institutions may affect the quality of accumulated factors of production. Henisz
(2000), for instance, argues that the risk of expropriation encourages the accumulation of
generic, as opposed to specific capital, because the former can be reallocated with more
ease. As specific capital is bound to be more efficient in performing the task for which it is
designed, this should affect productivity. This list of negative effects of weak institutions is
nonexhaustive. It is detailed and complemented in Hall and Jones (1999), Méon and Weill
(2005), and Méon et al. (2009).
3 Development accounting with the shadow economy
In this section, we estimate productivity levels across countries with and without the shadow
economy, and compare the results. To do so, we first present how we corrected the output
figures. We then introduce the development accounting method and the data on which it was
applied, and report the results.
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3.1 Correcting output figures
The prerequisite to correcting output figures is to measure the shadow economy. Data for
the shadow economy are taken from Schneider (2005a, 2005b),2 who calculates the size and
development of the shadow economy of 145 nations, including developing, transition, and
highly developed OECD countries, over the 1999 to 2003 period. Schneider (2005b) esti-
mates the relative size of the shadow economy with the help of structural equation modeling
(DYMIMIC: dynamic multiple indicators, multiple causes), employing variables such as
direct and indirect taxation, customs duties, government regulations, the rate of unemploy-
ment, growth rate of real GDP, and currency circulation. While the DYMIMIC approach
produces estimated relative sizes of the shadow economy, another step is necessary to gain
absolute values. In order to calibrate absolute figures of the size of the shadow economies
from the relative DYMIMIC estimation results, Schneider uses previous estimates for a num-
ber of countries.
According to these data, the average size of the shadow economy as a percentage of
official GDP in 37 African states is 41 %. In Central and South America, this value is also
41 %, while in Asia, the average value is much lower (29 %). Regarding transition countries,
the value is 38 %, and it is 17 % for the OECD. Looking at the unweighted average of the
145 countries in the sample, the relative size of the shadow economy is 34 % in 1999–2000.
We added the shadow economy output to the official output figures, thereby obtaining
what we refer to as total output.3 The data on official output stem from the Penn World
Tables, version 6.2.4 While Heston et al. (2006) do not introduce any corrections to the
2Note that our results do not depend on the choice of a particular set of estimates for the shadow economy.
As alternative estimates for the size of the shadow economy, we take two indicators from Friedman et al.
(2000), who collected data on the unofficial economy for 69 countries from various sources. We use three
sets of estimates taken from Schneider and Enste (2000): First, we use average estimates for the years 1990
to 1993 employing the physical input (electricity) method. Second, we use their MIMIC estimates over the
same period of time, while our third indicator complements the first with data for the years 1989 and 1990,
using the same method (taken from Johnson et al. 1997). As we report in Tables A7 and A8 in the working
paper version of this article (Dreher et al. 2012), our results are robust to this choice.
3Note that we cannot correct input figures for the size of the shadow economy. Regarding labor, we proxy
the labor force with the working age population. As shown by Caselli (2005), taking into account differences
in hours worked is unlikely to affect the outcome of development accounting analyses. Not adjusting labor
inputs should therefore prove of little importance for our results. Regarding capital, it has been stressed
that small scale activities dominate this sector (ILO 1972), at least in developing economies, and that it
therefore generates low levels of income and little accumulation (Gërxhani 2004). As Tanzi (1999) remarks,
individuals who operate in the shadow economy often use capital or tools that are borrowed from the official
economy. Hillman et al. (1995) back this claim with anecdotal evidence from Bulgaria, reporting that formal
state enterprises have been rented out to informal entrepreneurs. This implies that there may be little capital
specific to the shadow economy. To the extent that some unregistered capital operates in the shadow economy,
our results might overestimate TFP. See Sect. 5 in Dreher et al. (2012) for details. Moreover, countries with
poor institutions are also those where public investment is the least efficient, as Pritchett (2000) argues, and
experience more frequent destruction due to natural disasters, as Caselli and Malhotra (2004) emphasize.
The perpetual inventory method, which does not control for the efficiency of investment and assumes a
constant rate of depreciation across countries, thus overestimates badly governed countries’ capital stocks,
and underestimates their TFPs. Therefore, using more accurate measures of the capital stock would further
weaken the link between institutions and TFP, and strengthen our findings.
4To obtain meaningful international comparisons, we used PPP-converted GDP per capita figures for official
GDP. It is referred to as rgdpwok in PWT6.2. In the sample of countries for which we could obtain data
on both GDP and the shadow economy, the mean of the uncorrected official output was $18,941 PPP per
capita, and the mean of total corrected output was $23,640 PPP per capita. Table 1 below provides more
detailed descriptive statistics on official and corrected outputs. Appendix A reports descriptive statistics for
all variables, while Appendix B shows the definitions and sources.
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Table 1 Distribution of official and total output
Largest sample Restricted sample
y ytot y ytot
Mean 18,941 23,640 22,834 27,999
Standard deviation 18,996 21,998 20,339 23,059
Maximum/minimum 75.83 59.46 38.50 31.14
Number of countries 136 136 76 76
y denotes official output per worker and ytot total output per worker defined as official output plus the shadow
economy
official data in order to correct for the size of the shadow economy, some countries do adjust
their official data. This may result in double counting when correcting output figures. We
carefully checked individual countries’ practices to determine which ones officially correct
their GDP figures. Our search revealed that of the 133 countries included in our sample,5
39 countries perform such an adjustment. To the best of our knowledge, the country that
performs the most careful correction of its GDP figures is Italy. The Italian statistical office
(ISTAT) calculates the size and development of the shadow economy, thanks mainly to the
discrepancy method, and uses these estimates to compute official GDP figures.6
In other countries, statistical offices also mostly use the discrepancy method, as well as
microdata on the size and development of the shadow economy in certain sectors on occa-
sion (e.g., the services sector (hotels, restaurants) or the construction sector). A substantial
problem with these corrections is that they are carried out only for a few specific service
sectors, and that they are merely mentioned in a footnote, if at all. There is no detailed docu-
mentation of what has been corrected, whether the total size of the shadow economy actually
has been taken into account, or more likely, whether shadow economy activities have been
corrected for in a few sectors only. Given that we cannot be sure what has been corrected
for, and whether the bulk of shadow economy activities are really captured, we decided to
ignore these corrections for the majority of our study. Accordingly, we correct the official
GDP in all countries by adding the size of the shadow economy estimated according to the
sources we use in this study. Admittedly, this may involve some double counting and overes-
timation of total GDP in countries that already correct official GDP figures for some shadow
activities.7
Table 1 compares official (y) and total (ytot) output per worker measured in PPP dollars.
We focus on the year 2000, because it maximizes the number of observations in our sample.
We report data on two samples: First, we describe the largest sample for which we could find
data on output per worker and the shadow economy, which features 136 countries. Second,
we use a restricted sample for which we have not only data on output per worker and the
shadow economy, but also on human and physical capital stocks.
As Table 1 shows, adding the output produced in the shadow economy to official out-
put increases both the mean and standard deviation of output. This is not surprising, be-
5Listed in Appendix F of Dreher et al. (2012).
6The discrepancy method compares Gross National Product (GNP) based on expenditures with GNP based
on income. According to the estimates, the size of the Italian shadow economy amounts to 15–17 % of GDP
in the year 2000 (Castellucci 2007), while the estimates we use here range between 20 % and 27 %.
7We replicated the analysis by not adjusting official GDP at all in these countries. As we show in Tables A9
and A10 of Dreher et al. (2012), our results are strengthened by this.
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cause the shadow economy cannot be negative. However, Table 1 also reports the ratio of
maximum to minimum output. The ratio decreases with the inclusion of the shadow econ-
omy to the output figures in both samples, which suggests that the distribution of outputs is
more concentrated.8 This is due to the fact that the shadow economy tends to be larger in
poorer countries. To be more specific, the coefficient of correlation between the share of the
shadow economy and official output per worker is −0.67 in the larger sample and −0.71
in the restricted sample. Official figures therefore tend to overestimate the differences in
output across countries. The observed differences in outputs are therefore reduced when the
shadow economy is taken into account. In the next section, we investigate the impact of this
correction on the development accounting results.
3.2 The development accounting method
Development accounting estimates countries’ outputs as a function of their factor endow-
ments and compares the estimated figures with actual output figures. The difference be-
tween the two gives total factor productivity (TFP), or the Solow residual, depending on the
reader’s optimism. To do so, the standard method in the literature is the calibration approach
surveyed by Caselli (2005), and used by King and Levine (1994), Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (1997), Prescott (1998) and Hall and Jones (1999), among others. Following the stan-
dard specification used in the vast majority of development accounting studies, we assume
a Cobb–Douglas specification. As Aiyar and Dalgaard (2009) show, it is a good approxima-
tion for cross-country development accounting. In per worker terms, the production function
reads:
y = Akαh1−α (1)
where y is the country’s output per worker, k its physical capital stock per worker, and h the
average human capital stock per worker. A is total factor productivity, and α a parameter
that measures the contribution of capital to output.
Total factor productivity is then estimated by solving the above equation for A. This
gives:
A = y/(kαh1−α). (2)
One may remark that if output y is underestimated, then A will be as well. As we have
just shown in the previous section, the share of total economic activity that takes place in
the shadow economy is systematically overlooked by most official statistics. TFP computed
from official figures may thus be biased.
To compute A, one needs a value for α and data on y, k, and h. It is commonly assumed
that a reasonable estimate for α is around 0.3, such as in Caselli (2005), Hall and Jones
(1999), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), or Collins et al. (1996).9
However, although this parameter’s value is critical in development accounting exercises,
as Caselli (2005) shows, the specific value admittedly is arbitrary. Although it is true that it
corresponds to the US long run average, it may be quite different for other countries. Indeed,
8We performed the same computations with alternative corrected GDP figures, where the size of the shadow
economy was set to zero for countries that officially include at least part of it in their official statistics. The
results were qualitatively the same as in Table 1. We do no reproduce them here to keep the paper within
reasonable space limits, but they are available on request.
9To be specific, Caselli (2005) and Hall and Jones (1999) precisely assume α = 0.3, whereas Prescott (1998)
considers α = 0.25, and Collins et al. (1996) assume α = 0.35.
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the estimates of α that are reported in the literature vary widely. Thus, Cavalcanti Ferreira
et al. (2004) report estimates of α that are approximately equal to 0.43. Moreover, estimates
of α obtained when the production function is estimated based on efficiency frontier tech-
niques frequently reach 0.8, as in Kneller and Stevens (2003). Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader
(2007) assess α in MENA countries and conclude that the share of capital often exceeds 0.6
there. They even report estimates of more than 0.9 for the region’s α. When studying OECD
countries, Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2009) also reject the 0.3 estimate and find that alpha
robustly is greater than 0.5. However, the most systematic attempt at assessing the share of
capital in a large sample of countries is Senhadji’s (2000), providing estimates for a sample
of 88 developed and developing countries. He also rejects the estimate of 0.3, observing
large cross-country variations for this parameter. The world mean and the world median are
found to be 0.55 and 0.57, respectively.
Therefore, as 0.3 seems to be a very small value for α, and any exogenously imposed
value is arbitrary; we endogenized the magnitude of this parameter, following various meth-
ods. Specifically, we first estimated the coefficient of the Cobb–Douglas production function
given by (1) on our cross-country sample. This allowed us to use both official and total out-
put. We then used the panel dimension of our data over the 1980–2000 period.10 Here, we
first computed both pooled and between regressions and then ran a panel regression with
fixed country effects, as well as subsequently adding fixed time effects. We also ran two ran-
dom effects regressions, one including country effects only, and another including random
time effects as well.
According to our results, the estimates of α remain in a fairly narrow range of 0.5–0.6.11
They approximately average out to 0.57, which corresponds to Senhadji’s (2000) estimate
of the world median. We will therefore use this value in our calculations below. Note, how-
ever, that using the mean value of 0.55 obtained by Senhadji does not change our results.
Arguably, an α of 0.57 remains a conservative guess, given that Senhadji (2000) reports es-
timates of α for individual countries or regions that often exceed it. This value allows for an
investigation of the impact of increasing the capital share in the production function, while
leaving a role for differences in TFP in explaining cross-country differences in per worker
output. As Caselli (2005) shows, variations in factor endowments explain the totality of
cross-country differences in output per worker with values of α exceeding 0.6.12
10We restricted our observations to this period in order to minimize the impact of the initial capital stock.
11See Appendix D in Dreher et al. (2012).
12Because we estimate the value of α instead of postulating it, our strategy goes beyond the standard de-
velopment accounting literature. We tested the robustness of our results by setting α to 0.3 and 0.6. When
we use a value of 0.6 the results match those reported below. When employing a value of 0.3, the results
are weaker, due to the reduced role of capital in the production function. As we show below, the impact
of institutions on output mainly works through its impact on capital, so that using a lower α increases not
only the Solow residual, but also its correlation with institutions. See Table A5 in Dreher et al. (2012). One
may also want to use a specific value of α for each country or each group of countries. However, assuming
different αs in a cross-country development accounting exercise would be at odds with the objective of that
literature, which is precisely to see how much of the cross-country variation in output a common production
function can explain. This is why the literature systematically assumes a constant α across countries. We
adopt this assumption for the same reason. Most importantly, deviating from this assumption would prevent
any meaningful comparison between our results and previous studies explaining differences in output em-
ploying a single production function. However, while that would go beyond the scope of the present paper,
we acknowledge that considering country or region-specific αs would be interesting for future research.
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The number of workers was computed from the Penn World Tables 6.2 dataset.13 The hu-
man capital stock is usually computed as a function of years of schooling in the population.
Following Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005), we accordingly define h as:
h = eφ(s) (3)
where s is the average number of years of schooling in the population over 25 years
old, taken from Barro and Lee’s (2001) dataset, and φ a piecewise linear function such
that φ(s) = 0.134 ∗ s if s ≤ 4, φ(s) = 0.134 ∗ 4 + 0.101 ∗ (s − 4) if 4 < s ≤ 8, and
φ(s) = 0.134 ∗ 4 + 0.101 ∗ 4 + 0.068 ∗ (s − 8) if s > 8. Since the study of Hall and Jones
(1999), this definition of human capital is routinely used in development accounting. Its
motivation is as follows: According to our model, workers’ wages should be proportional to
their human capital. The relationship between wage and education is commonly assumed to
be log-linear at the country level, yet the cross-country pattern of the education-wage pro-
file seems convex. Using a piecewise linear specification allows taking stock of within and
cross-country evidence. In Barro and Lee’s dataset, the last year for which this statistic can
be computed is 2000.
The last set of data required for our calculations is the stock of capital. Again, we fol-
lowed the literature and computed it by applying the perpetual inventory method, where the
capital stock of a particular year, Kt , is defined as the sum of previous year’s investment,
It−1, and capital stock, Kt−1, to which a depreciation rate, δ, is applied. Hence, the capital
stock is given by:
Kt = Kt−1 ∗ (1 − δ) + It−1. (4)
Again, data on real investment in PPP terms were obtained from the Penn World Ta-
bles 6.2.14 These data are available from 1950 until 2004. However, not all countries have
complete series for the entire period. We therefore restricted our analysis to countries for
which the information was available from 1970 at the least.
To apply the above formula, however, we need the initial capital stock. Still following
Caselli (2005) and Hall and Jones (1999), we assume that the capital stock in the initial
year is equal to its steady-state value in the Solow growth model, namely K0 = I0/(g + δ),
where δ is usually set to 0.06 in the literature, I0 is the value of investment in the first year
for which an observation is available, and g is the average rate of growth for the investment
series between that year and 1970.15
Finally, we used the measures of uncorrected and corrected output per worker defined in
the previous subsection. Overall, we were able to obtain data on output per worker, physical
capital, human capital, and the shadow economy for 76 countries in the year 2000. The
key point here is to determine the extent to which the inclusion of the shadow economy in
output figures affects the observed role of the residual in explaining cross-country income
differences.
13Specifically, the number of workers was obtained by dividing total GDP by GDP per worker, that is
rgdpch ∗ pop ∗ 1000/rgdpwok, according to notations in the PWT6.2.
14That is rgdpl ∗ pop ∗ki in PWT6.2.
15Note that the impact of K0 on capital stocks in 2000 is quite small as we use no base year subsequent to
1970. Since the annual rate of depreciation is 6 %, the maximum share of the initial capital stock still in use
in 2000 cannot exceed 15 % of its initial value. Caselli (2005) moreover points out that although changing
the value of this parameter changes the relative weight of past and recent investment, it has almost no effect
on the outcome of development accounting.
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Table 2 Measures of success of the factor-only model and descriptive statistics of implied productivity
success1 success2 Mean A Standard
deviation of A
MaxA/MinA
Official output 0.797 0.571 2.559 0.699 4.708
Total output 0.901 0.705 3.337 0.913 4.584
To measure the impact of including the shadow economy in output figures on the capacity
of factor endowments to explain income differences, we compare figures on actual output per
worker with output predicted by a model considering factor endowments only, i.e., yKH ≡
kαh1−α , called the factor-only model. We then assess its relevance by computing the two
measures of success defined in Caselli (2005). The first one is the ratio of the log-variance
of the factor-only output to the log-variance of observed output. The second one is the ratio
of the 90th to the 10th percentile of the factor-only output to the ratio of the 90th to the 10th
percentile of observed output:










We compute the two measures of success with official output figures and output figures
corrected for the shadow economy, respectively. The first two columns of Table 2 display
the results of our calculations. The results displayed in Table 2 are in line with the usual
findings in the literature.16 Namely, it appears that the factor-only model fails to account for
all of the variance in output. However, the key finding of Table 2 appears when comparing
the results obtained with official figures to those obtained with corrected figures. Here, we
observe that the measures of success of the factor-only model are substantially greater when
corrected figures are used instead of official figures. Table 2 shows that, in our sample, the
correction adds around 20 percentage points to those measures.
The last three columns of Table 2 provide more information on the impact of adding the
shadow economy to official output figures. The distribution of official TFPs is described in
the first line and the distribution of corrected TFPs (including the shadow economy) in the
following line. These results resemble those in Table 1. Specifically, it appears that both the
mean and the standard deviation of TFPs increase when the shadow economy is taken into
account. Additionally, the ratio of maximum to minimum TFP decreases, implying that the
distribution of TFPs becomes more concentrated.17 The rationale for this result again stems
from the fact that a smaller share of output is officially reported in poorer countries, with
their TFP therefore likely to be relatively more underestimated than that of richer countries.
As a result, correcting for the shadow economy leads to a more concentrated distribution
16The results also remained qualitatively unchanged when we used our alternative definition of total output,
not adjusting for those countries that do provide partial adjustment themselves. Both success1 and success2
rose when using corrected figures instead of official ones.
17Again, the same results were obtained when using the alternative definition of total output.
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Table 3 Productivity calculations: ratios to United States values
Country y ytot A Atot
USA 1 1 1 1
Norway 0.953 1.044 0.859 0.941
Singapore 0.876 0.911 0.854 0.889
France 0.824 0.873 0.914 0.968
Italy 0.758 0.886 0.915 1.070
Hong-Kong 0.750 0.804 0.905 0.970
Canada 0.743 0.793 0.823 0.878
Great Britain 0.734 0.761 0.978 1.014
Japan 0.664 0.680 0.655 0.671
Argentina 0.417 0.481 0.821 0.947
Mexico 0.293 0.350 0.763 0.913
Brazil 0.231 0.297 0.725 0.933
Egypt 0.178 0.221 1.226 1.524
Philippines 0.138 0.182 0.623 0.822
China 0.100 0.103 0.510 0.529
India 0.090 0.102 0.727 0.823
Kenya 0.037 0.045 0.455 0.563
Malawi 0.026 0.034 0.551 0.711
Mean 0.340 0.384 0.765 0.918
Correlation with y 1 0.995 0.435 0.140
y denotes official output per worker and ytot total output per worker defined as official output plus the shadow
economy. A stands for TFP computed using official figures. Atot denotes TFP computed with figures corrected
for the shadow economy
of TFP. To illustrate these results, Table 3 picks some countries from the sample and dis-
plays their respective official incomes, total incomes, and productivity levels. To facilitate
comparison, all values are given relative to the United States, and countries are ranked in
descending order based on official GDP per worker. Table 3 also recalls summary statistics
for the entire sample, and the correlation of each displayed variable with official output per
worker.
Table 3 confirms that productivity differences are responsible for the bulk of differences
in output per worker. The same diagnosis can be made regardless of the definition of out-
put, official or corrected, used for computations.18 On the other hand, the table shows that
the rise in output due to the inclusion of the shadow economy can indeed be quite large
for some countries, especially poorer ones, with the result being that total productivity can
be severely underestimated in countries with a large shadow sector. For instance, Malawi’s
official productivity level is 55 % of that of the United States. However, when corrected fig-
18Some TFP estimates may look surprising. For instance, China’s estimated TFP is 0.51 times that of US
TFP with official output, and 0.53 with total output. Those figures may look small, but they are larger than
the estimates provided by Hall and Jones (1999), who estimated China’s TFP to be around 10 % of the US
level in 1988. TFP conversely seems high in Egypt, but that finding is in line with Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader
(2007), who report that TFP growth accounted for the bulk of the country’s growth over the 1960–1998
period.
132 Public Choice (2014) 158:121–141
ures are used, Malawi’s TFP relative to the United States becomes 71 %. A similar order of
magnitude can be found in a middle-income country like Brazil, where overall TFP relative
to the United States is 93 %, compared to 73 % for official TFP. Its GDP thus becomes 93 %
of that of the United States, instead of 73 %. Even among developed countries, the inclusion
of the shadow economy can affect our perception of TFP differences, although its absolute
increase remains smaller. Countries like Italy or Great Britain can thus make up all of their
difference vis-à-vis the United States, as the upper half of Table 3 shows.
More generally, all the variables displayed in Table 3 appear to be positively correlated
with official output per worker. Richer countries also tend to be more productive. More
remarkable, however, is the fact that the correlation of TFP with output decreases from 0.44
to 0.14 when shadow output is added to official output. The intuition behind this finding
is that the share of the shadow economy tends to increase when income decreases. Poorer
countries therefore report a smaller fraction of their total output. This introduces a systematic
bias that results in underestimating TFP in poor countries, which increases the correlation
between output and TFP. When this statistical artifact is corrected, the correlation between
output and TFP consequently becomes less clear, which is precisely what our calculations
reveal.
Overall, these results may cast some doubt on the usual finding that the quality of institu-
tions is positively correlated with productivity, because the observed relationship may also
be driven by unreported output. The next section investigates this possibility.
4 Do institutions really affect output and productivity after all?
The aim of this section is to assess the robustness of previous results, which have emphasized
institutional quality as a major determinant of per capita income and TFP, to the correction
of official GDP figures for the shadow economy. Accordingly, we first look at whether we
can replicate previous findings on the negative impact of institutional quality on the informal
sector. We then proceed by examining the impact of institutions on per capita output, and
finally on TFP.
To do so, our primary measure of institutional quality is the rule of law, which has been
an important focus of the literature on institutions and economic performance, e.g., Rodrik
et al. (2004), or Dollar and Kraay (2003).19 It is measured by the World Bank’s rule of law
index (Kaufmann et al. 2006) for the year 2000, an index measuring whether, and to what
extent, institutions protect property rights, and reliably enforced laws and regulations govern
economic and social interactions. It is based on perceptions recorded in a large number of
independent polls and surveys.
4.1 The shadow economy
To assess the impact of institutional quality on the size of the shadow economy, we chose a
parsimonious model, including GDP per capita as the only additional explanatory variable.
The results show that GDP per capita does not affect the share of the underground economy
19We test for the stability of our results by replacing the rule of law with the World Bank’s control of corrup-
tion, voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the average
of the individual indicators. As we report in Appendices A2 and A3 of this paper’s working paper version
(Dreher et al. 2012), the results are robust to the choice of indicator.
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at conventional levels of significance.20 The result, however, confirms previous research
showing that good institutions are negatively related to the shadow economy. At the 1 %
level of significance, a better rule of law reduces the share of the shadow economy. Specif-
ically, an increase in the rule of law index by one point reduces the shadow economy by
0.3 percentage points.21 This amounts to a standardized beta coefficient of almost 0.8. This
result, for 133 countries, is in line with the models of Johnson et al. (1997) and Hindriks
et al. (1999), as well as the results reported in Johnson et al. (1997, 1998b), which show
that corruption increases the shadow economy in a cross section of 15 and 39 countries,
respectively.
4.2 Output
We proceed by examining the impact of institutions on official and unofficial (logged) output
per worker. Again, we follow Hall and Jones (1999) and opt for a parsimonious specification,
including only the rule of law as an explanatory variable, and starting with OLS. However,
institutions might well depend on GDP and could as such be endogenous. To control for
a potential endogeneity bias, we instrument the rule of law index employing the variables
suggested in Hall and Jones (1999) as instruments for institutional quality. Their instru-
ments measure the extent of Western influence in a country from the sixteenth to nineteenth
century, which is exogenous to GDP, but highly correlated with institutions. According to
Hall and Jones, European influence is unlikely to have been stronger in regions more likely
to have a higher GDP today. The first reason for this is that, for the most part, Europeans
conquered resource-rich regions, which are not systematically among the countries with
high output per worker today. The second reason is that European influence concentrated on
sparsely settled regions. As these were frequently regions with low productivity, there should
again be no tendency for these regions to be among those with high output per worker today.
Despite this, past European influence is still likely to be highly correlated with the rule
of law. As Hall and Jones (1999) point out, countries most strongly influenced by West-
ern Europe are among those most likely to adopt favorable institutional infrastructures. We
employ the percentage of a country’s population speaking one of the five primary West-
ern European languages as their mother tongue. In addition, we use the absolute value of
a country’s latitude in degrees, which measures the distance from the equator.22 Table 4
shows the results. Columns 1 and 2 report OLS estimates. While column 1 refers to official
GDP, column 2 employs corrected output figures, i.e., overall output including the shadow
economy. Given the negative impact of the rule of law on the shadow economy, we would
expect the impact of the rule of law on output to be smaller or vanish completely once the
underground economy is included. The results show that the impact of the rule of law on
total output is smaller than its impact on official output. However, improvements in the rule
of law still increase output when the shadow economy is taken into account—the positive
impact on official GDP apparently dominates the negative impact on the size of the shadow
economy. According to the coefficients, an increase in the rule of law index by one point
20See Table A1 in Dreher et al. (2012).
21This index is measured on a −2.5 to 2.5 scale. It ranges from −2.37 to 2.11 in our sample.
22Hall and Jones provide two plausible motivations for this: First, Western European settlers were more
likely to migrate to sparsely populated areas in the fifteenth century. Second, they were more likely to settle
in regions with climates similar to Western Europe, which is true for regions far from the equator. The validity
of latitude as an instrument for institutional quality is confirmed in Acemoglu et al. (2001), who do not find
an independent effect of distance from the equator on economic performance.
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Table 4 Institutions and output, year 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Number of countries 133 133 124 124
Dependent variable Official output Total output Official output Total output
Rule of law 0.93 0.86 1.31 1.23
(19.53)*** (17.93)*** (11.20)*** (10.66)***
R-squared 0.64 0.60 0.54 0.50
First-stage F-test 36.52 36.52
Sargan test (p-value) 0.14 0.11
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; *** significant at 1 %
Constant term included but not reported
increases official output by 9.3 %, while increasing total output by only 8.6 %. With the
rule of law index varying from −2.37 to 2.11 among the countries included in our sample,
the difference between the parameters of the two models is not dramatic. While it is sig-
nificant at the 1 % level, the standardized regression (beta) coefficients are 0.8 and 0.78,
respectively.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 report the results of our instrumental variables approach. As
shown in the table, the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected at conventional levels of
significance. The instruments are jointly significant at the 1 % level in both first-stage re-
gressions, and the F-test statistic easily exceeds the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 proposed
by Staiger and Stock (1997), indicating that the instruments have some power.
As can be seen, the impact of the rule of law on output remains significant at the 1 %
percent level in both specifications, with a positive coefficient. The coefficients show that an
increase in the rule of law index by 0.1 increases official output by 13.1 %, and total output
by 12.3 %. Again, the impact of the rule of law is thus smaller when focusing on total output
as compared to official output. The difference between the parameters of the two models is
significant, at the 5 % level, but they are of similar magnitude. This is confirmed by the beta
coefficients of 1.12 and 1.11, respectively.23
4.3 Total factor productivity
Tables 5a and 5b focus on total factor productivity. When instrumenting institutional quality
with latitude and the percentage of major European languages spoken, the Sargan test rejects
23To test for robustness, we split the sample according to income and the rule of law. The threshold value for
income was set to US$6000, which is the average value among our sample of countries. The strong rule of
law group includes countries with a rule of law in the highest quartile, while we define countries with a weak
rule of law to contain all other countries. The results for the low-income and weak rule of law groups very
much resemble those of the previous sample (see Table A4 in Dreher et al. 2012). In the group of countries
with high income and a strong rule of law, there is a substantial decline in the magnitude of the impact of the
rule of law on output when we take the shadow economy into account. In the 2SLS regressions the impact of
the rule of law is no longer significant at conventional levels. The reasoning behind this finding is twofold.
First, it may be due to the fact that the small number of countries in the sub-sample does not allow for the
identification of a significant impact. Second, it may be due to the fact that the elasticity of output with respect
to governance is smaller in countries with good governance.
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Table 5a Institutions and total factor productivity, 76 countries, year 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Official TFP Total TFP Official TFP Total TFP
Rule of law 0.25 0.07 0.24 0.04
(3.91)*** (0.83) (3.49)*** (0.38)
R-squared 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.01
First-stage F-test 116.55 116.55
Sargan test (p-value) 0.92 0.98
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; *** significant at 1 %
Constant term included but not reported
Table 5b Institutions and total factor productivity, 76 countries, year 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Method OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent variable Official TFP Total TFP Official TFP Total TFP
Rule of law 0.24 0.05 0.22 −0.01
(2.80)*** (0.42) (2.24)** (0.10)
Government consumption −0.006 −0.006 −0.005 0.001
(percent of GDP) (0.35) (0.25) (0.23) (0.04)
Inflation −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(2.44)** (2.32)** (2.51)** (2.48)**
R-squared 0.18 0.04 0.18 0.04
First-stage F-test 70.41 70.41
Sargan test (p-value) 0.86 0.97
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %
Constant term included but not reported
the overidentifying restrictions, casting doubts on the exogeneity of the instruments. The
analysis presented in the table therefore employs the share of native English speakers instead
of focusing on five languages (as suggested by Hall and Jones 1999) and GDP per capita.
It now appears that while the rule of law is highly correlated with GDP per capita, it is
not significantly correlated with total factor productivity (0.84 and, respectively, 0.3). This
suggests that the impact of institutions on output mainly runs through factor endowments
as opposed to productivity. While the results are not affected by the choice of instruments,
now the Sargan test does not reject the overidentifying restrictions at conventional levels of
significance.
We present two sets of results. First, Table 5a again employs a parsimonious model,
including the rule of law index as the only explanatory variable. Second, in Table 5b, we
additionally control for government consumption (as a percentage of GDP) and the rate of
inflation. Both variables create distortions; thus it is reasonable to expect that they will affect
the relationship between the rule of law and factor productivity.
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Table 6 Decomposing the impact of institutions on total output, 2SLS, 76 countries, year 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable logytot α log k (1 − α) logh log tfp log(1 + shadow)
Rule of law 0.99 0.83 0.10 0.14 −0.09
(11.17)*** (9.85)*** (9.54)*** (3.32)*** (9.59)***
R-squared 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.16 0.54
First-stage F-test 42.16 42.16 42.16 42.16 42.16
Sargan test (p-value) 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.11
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses; *** significant at 1 %
Constant term included but not reported
According to the results of both specifications, the rule of law significantly increases to-
tal factor productivity when official output is concerned. However, turning to total output,
this result no longer holds. According to the OLS and instrumental variables estimates, the
impact of the rule of law on total factor productivity no longer exists once we control for the
size of the shadow economy. This result has important implications for empirical research on
the impact of institutional quality on productivity. While good institutions increase official
output, they simultaneously decrease the size of the underground economy. As a conse-
quence, total factor productivity does not seem to be affected by the quality of institutions.
Regarding the control variables, Table 5b shows that government consumption does not af-
fect factor productivity in any specification, while productivity declines with inflation, at
the 5 % level of significance. The first-stage F-test indicates that the instruments have some
explanatory power, while the Sargan test does not reject the overidentifying restrictions at
conventional levels of significance. Overall, these results suggest a new implication regard-
ing the findings reported by Hall and Jones (1999) or Lambsdorff (2003), for example. Their
finding that the quality of institutions affects official productivity may indeed be driven by
the fact that they used official figures and, therefore, underestimated output. Consequently,
their estimates may not only imply that some production disappears in weak institutional
frameworks, but also that some production goes underground.
However, as argued in Sect. 2.2, the quality of institutions not only affects TFP and
the size of the shadow economy, but also the accumulation of factors of production. Ac-
cordingly, Hall and Jones (1999) show that the impact of institutions on output is due to
their joint effect on the stock of physical capital, the stock of human capital, and TFP. Ta-
ble 6 provides a similar decomposition, taking into account the extra impact of institutions
on the shadow economy. With total output being equal to official output plus the shadow
economy, expression (1) implies that the sum of the coefficients of institutions that appear
in columns (2) to (5) of Table 6 should equal the coefficient that appears in the first col-
umn.24
According to Table 6, total output increases with the rule of law in the restricted sample
of 76 countries, at the 1 % level of significance, confirming the results of Table 4. These
results confirm that the impact of institutional quality on total output runs through its effect
on physical capital, human capital, and TFP, but also show that it is partly compensated by
its impact on the shadow economy. They, however, also imply that the biggest share of the
impact of institutional quality on output runs through the capital stock per worker. More
24This comes from the definition of total output as ytot = (1 + shadow) ∗ y = (1 + shadow) ∗ AKαh1−α .
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specifically, the estimates reported in the first column of Table 6 show that an increase in the
rule of law index by 0.1 results in a 9.9 % increase in total output per worker. Out of this
9.9 %, 8.3 % is due to an increase in the physical capital stock, 1 % to an increase in the
human capital stock, and 1.4 % to TFP. However, the same improvement also decreases the
shadow economy and this decomposition illustrates how neglecting the shadow economy
leads to overestimating the impact of institutions on output.25
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we reexamined the nexus between output, productivity, and institutions, while
taking account of the importance of the shadow economy across the world. With this in
mind, we studied the distribution and institutional determinants of output and total factor
productivity (TFP), comparing the results obtained with both official output and total out-
put, with the latter being defined as the sum of output produced in the official and shadow
economies.
According to our results, the cross-country distribution of output becomes less dispersed
when official output figures are corrected for the shadow economy. This is due to the fact
that the share of unrecorded activity is larger in poorer countries. Thus, these countries’ total
production tends to be underestimated by official figures.
To check how the omission of the shadow economy from official output figures may bias
productivity measures, we performed a development accounting analysis with both official
and corrected output figures. Our results show that when using official figures, total factor
productivity is underestimated, especially in poor countries. Moreover, we observe that cor-
recting output for the shadow economy leads to an increase in the predictive power of the
factor-only model. Part of the puzzle as to why factor endowments have a limited ability
in explaining cross-country differences in output per worker may thus be explained by the
existence of the shadow economy.
Deepening the level of explanation regarding differences in countries’ economic perfor-
mance, we then studied the impact of the quality of the institutional framework. While we
were able to replicate the usual association of output and TFP with institutions when we used
official figures, we obtained more qualified results upon employing corrected output figures.
In particular, although total output is significantly positively correlated with institutional
quality, the estimated impact of institutions is smaller than the one obtained with official
output. Even more striking is the impact of our correction on the relationship between TFP
and institutions. More specifically, even though we observe the usual positive correlation
between TFP and institutional quality when output is measured by official figures, this cor-
relation loses significance when corrected output is used instead. These findings call for a
reinterpretation of earlier studies that have emphasized the relationship between measured
TFP and institutional quality.
25Again, we also split the sample according to income and the rule of law. As shown in Table A5 in Dreher
et al. (2012), the results hold for the sample of 50 low-income countries, while neither official nor total
productivity are affected in the sample of 26 countries with above average GDP per capita. This suggests that
our results are mainly driven by low-income countries. When we split the sample according to the rule of
law, all coefficients are insignificant at conventional levels in the sample with weak rule of law countries. In
the sample with strong rule of law countries, one coefficient even turns significantly negative. Due to both the
small sample sizes and the reduced variance due to splitting the sample according to the dependent variable,
it is not possible to give much credence to these results.
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The main rationale behind our results is that weak institutions not lead only to less fac-
tor accumulation, but also encourage participation in the shadow economy. The observed
negative correlation between weak institutions and official output is therefore driven both
by a reduction in production and a switch from the formal to the informal sector. Using
official output to estimate the relationship between institutions and output implies that the
production of countries with weaker institutions will be underestimated, thereby inflating
the observed relationship. As a result, when shadow output is added to official output the
correlation weakens. Using official output figures to compute TFP leads to the same bias.
Thus, correcting official figures for the shadow economy also weakens the relationship be-
tween institutions and TFP, or even goes as far as removing it altogether. The essence of our
results suggests that part of the observed relationships reported in the previous literature is
not due to a reduction of output, but instead due to a switch from the formal to the informal
sector.
Our results have broad implications for the empirical literature on the determinants and
consequences of GDP. Since the shadow economy tends to be larger in countries with a
lower official GDP, results employing uncorrected figures will reflect this bias. Whenever
the interest of the researcher is based on income, instead of official income, corrected fig-
ures should be used instead of official ones. These results also have important implications
for policy makers. What matters for policy makers in most cases is income, and not income
as it is officially measured. Statistical offices around the world should give priority to more
precise estimates of the amount of underground activity in the country, thus producing re-
liable estimates of overall economic activity. Arguably, for some governments this would
imply acknowledging the existence of a substantial amount of underground activity, which
politicians in many countries will not find it easy.
At the same time, what our results underline is that development accounting is a pow-
erful tool of analysis that still needs improvement. This paves the way for exciting future
research that may still change our understanding of the determinants of relative economic
performance of countries all over the world.
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Appendix A: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation
Official output per worker (log) 9.34 6.79 11.65 1.17
Shadow economy (percent) 33.46 8.60 67.10 12.87
Total output per worker (log) 9.57 7.18 11.26 1.09
Number of workers 16800000 29751 755000000 68000000
Capital stock 83000000000000 117000000000 2030000000000000 252000000000000
Investment 5140000000000 305000000 236000000000000 21700000000000
Schooling 6.18 1.00 12.00 2.91
Human capital stock 2.15 1.11 3.42 0.59
Latitude 17.58 −36.89 64.22 23.70
Language (fife primary) 22.85 0.00 100.00 38.59
Language (English) 9.17 0.00 100.00 26.49
Rule of law −0.09 2.37 2.11 −0.99
Corruption −0.07 2.13 2.49 −1.00
Government effectiveness −0.05 2.34 2.33 −1.00
Political stability −0.20 −2.93 1.52 1.01
Voice and accountability −0.06 2.24 1.52 −1.01
Overall index −0.06 −2.26 1.85 0.91
GDP per capita 6001 86 44758 9043
Government consumption 16.42 3.83 63.78 7.71
Inflation 13.25 3.85 550.01 −52.26
Appendix B: Sources and definitions
Variable Description Source
Official output per worker (y) Official output per worker measured in PPP dollars. Penn World Tables version 6.2
Shadow economy (shadow) Size of the shadow economy in percent of official
GDP.
Schneider (2005a, 2005b)
Total output per worker (ytot) Official output corrected for the share of the shadow
economy.
Number of workers (L) Computed as rgdpch ∗ pop ∗ 1000/rgdpwok. Penn World Tables version 6.2
Investment (I ) Computed as rgdpl ∗ pop ∗ki. Penn World Tables version 6.2
Initial capital stock (K0) Estimated as K0 = I0/(g + δ). Penn World Tables version 6.2
Capital stock (K) Computed as Kt = Kt−1 ∗ (1 − δ) + It−1.
Schooling (s) Average number of years of schooling in the
population over 25 years old.
Barro and Lee (2001)
Human capital (h) Defined as h = eφ(s) where φ is a piecewise linear
function.
Latitude Distance in degrees from the equator. Easterly and Sewadeh (2001)
Language Percentage of the population speaking one of the five
primary European languages: Portuguese, Spanish,
English, French, German.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Rule of law Perceptions based index, with higher numbers
showing “better” environments.
Kaufmann et al. (2006)
Corruption Perceptions based index, with higher numbers
showing “better” environments.
Kaufmann et al. (2006)
Government effectiveness Perceptions based index, with higher numbers
showing “better” environments.
Kaufmann et al. (2006)
Quality of bureaucracy Perceptions based index, with higher numbers
showing “better” environments.
Kaufmann et al. (2006)
Voice and accountability Perceptions based index, with higher numbers
showing “better” environments.
Kaufmann et al. (2006)
Overall index Average of rule of law, corruption, government
effectiveness, and quality of bureaucracy.
Own calculation
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$). World Bank (2006)
Government consumption General government final consumption expenditure in
percent of GDP.
World Bank (2006)
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual percent) World Bank (2006)
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